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Abstract 
This article explains aspects of citizenship by investment (CBI) nature through the 
lens of the concept of state-imposed exile and the weighting between an individual 
and the greater collective bound by the social contract. The paper concludes that CBI 
may act as some form of catalyst to overcome forms of exile. In doing so, the lens of 
exile may showcase issues and assumptions pertaining to CBI, as well as to 
citizenship itself. Citizenship and exile may act as antagonists within the problematic 
relationship of politics and law and the possible meanings of the ‘social contract’ in 
the relationship of the collective and the individual.    
 
I. Introduction: The many faces of ‘Exile’ 
In its legal dimension, citizenship is not a moral code or political value statement, but 
only that what it is actually stipulated for. In other words, while citizenship rules may 
demand language or cultural tests, naturalization or exemptions (CBI), the law cannot 
ensure solidarity, belonging, a moral code or (meaningful) political participation, 
which are all aspects virtually rendered redundant at law and spheres that are often, 
but wrongfully, conflated with citizenship's legal lens. Citizenship at law can act as a 
mechanism that pertains to the bordered paradigm, and enforce decisions of the 
community over the individual, including inroads into that individual’s rights.  
Poet and politician Dante Alighieri, in his own works, was taken on a journey to 
paradise, escaping from hell. This may relate to his actual physical exile. Dante was 
exiled from Florence where he served as one of six priors governing the city. It wasn't 
until Dante’s banishment that he began work on his Divine Comedy: In the poem's 
first book, the poet takes a tour through Hell with the poet Virgil as a guide toward 
intellectual freedom.  
Exile may then be viewed as a pathway to freedom, intellectually, spiritually, for which 
physical freedom may follow. Citizenship by Investment (CBI) may then pose as the 
catalyst system toward that pathway, and may take the form of self-exile, opting for 
alternative citizenship and residence options, as will be discussed below. 
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This article discusses and reconciles CBI and the notion of exile and banishment: For 
those who can afford it, CBI may provide a means to exit exiles and to provide lawful 
escapes from undue restrictions and unresolved status and legal limbo imposed.  
Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that "No one shall 
be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile."  
It is doubtful that banning Indian-Australians from returning home is indeed 
something akin to 'exile' at all, as any act of actively exiling or punitive or political 
reasons may be missing. Likewise, the move may not at all be arbitrary. The ban could 
well be justified at least as to the letter of the law. Even banishment is unlikely where 
there is no active sending away of someone from a country. However, that does not 
make the move by a state to impose a return ban on its own member any less 
problematic.  
In fact, when making decisions to exclude individuals from a life of participation in a 
polity, exiles, bans and bars may be supported by utilitarianist philosophy of the 
greater good, with focus on outcomes not acts, and on the collective’s well-being rather 
than individual happiness.  
Yet, overall, forms of ‘exile’ are problematic. Exile usually refers to banishment outside 
the borders of a given polity. While deportation is forced removal of non-citizens, 
extradition could be viewed as somewhat akin to the exiling of citizens, and it entailed 
the lifelong loss of citizenship and property. A milder form of was relegation, 
preserving citizenship and property. 
Temporary or permanent exile, sometimes established ultimately through the death of 
the exiled, is a constant motif in literature and art, such as in ancient Greek tragedy 
and mythology, for example, in Euripides’ Medea 431 BC. There, exile was seen as a 
fate worse than death, the exclusion from the social network, family, the polity, 
meaningful life, participation, and also from mobility and individual autonomy.  
The isle of St Helena, with 4,500 miles from England and 1,200 miles from West 
Africa, is the epitome of exile, but still within the influence and scrutiny of the Realm, 
was once described as being the place “further away from anywhere else in all the 
world”. As historian Frank McLynn asserts (1998, Napleon, 651), for English poet Lord 
Byron, Napoleon Bonaparte was a Romantic hero, a persecuted, lonely, and flawed 
genius. When Napoleon heard that Prussian troops had orders to capture him dead or 
alive, he fled to Rochefort, where he eventually surrendered to Captain Frederick 
Maitland on the HMS Bellerophon on 15 July 1815. Other than he had hoped, however, 
there was no place for him on the mainland, from which he was kept as far away as 
possible, as he was, indeed from any other polity.  
When a larger group, or occasionally a whole people is exiled over some substantive 
time, the term of diaspora comes to mind. The Jews, for instance, were deported by 
Babylonian King Nebuchadnezzar II in 586 BC and again, following destruction of the 
second Temple in Jerusalem, in 70 AD. During the period of National Socialism in the 
first few years following emergency powers and takeover in 1933, many Jews, as well 
as a significant number of German artists and intellectuals fled into exile. These 
included the author Klaus Mann, with whom Germany's own exile literature emerged.  
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Exile as the explicit refusal of permission to return home, may perhaps be viewed as a 
form of quasi- or temporary statelessness, the abandoning of a person from the civic 
polity and the prevention to (at least freely or meaningfully) exercise what is known as 
the Arendtian meta-‘right to have rights’ of citizenship (referring to Hannah Arendt 
work in the Origins of Totalitarianism) and the derivate rights that flow from that 
prime right. Exile then appears as something entirely different to the expatriation of 
citizens (vis-a-vis the deportation as a measure for non-citizens). It is most likely the 
establishing of a special status, at times, somewhat outside the metes and bounds of 
the law of the exiling polity, the effective casting out of the individual into either legal 
limbo or into some other jurisdiction. It can be punitive for the individual, and is 
usually justified on grounds of the protection of the polity. What exile means to 
individuals is to being forced away from one's home, whether this home is identified 
at local village level, town, city, state, province, territory, country or even region. Exile 
is, in civic terms, to make someone an outsider foreign to the polity whereas this 
person may still hold strong ties to the actual land or people. The exiled may still feel 
to belong. At its heart, it is the inability to return is what makes people become exiled, 
whether at law or in fact. Today, while digital platform are not polities, they do allow 
identity building: There may hence even be forms of digital exiling, such as the 
temporary exclusion or permanent banishment from social media, including the 
closing down of someone’s facebook or twitter account. People, as well as corporations 
and even governments may become exiled yet still operate from exile.  
The relation of exile and lifelong stigma or even death is an intimate one: In Roman 
law, exsilium meant both voluntary exile and banishment as a capital punishment 
alternative to death, including the lifelong loss of citizenship and the seizing of 
property by the authorities. It could effectively be used to wipe out one’s personal 
record in a polity, forcing the person to live amongst Barbarians and consequently, be 
viewed as foreigners themselves.  
Today, absent actual death, to deprive someone from return and participation for good 
may be likened to ‘dying the civil death’, a possible consequence of exile. Civil death 
(civiliter mortuus) is the loss of all or almost all civil rights by a person due to a 
conviction for a felony or due to an act by the government of a country that results in 
the loss of civil rights.  
In many indigenous communities around the world, including in Australian 
Aboriginal criminal justice, exile is a punishment considered worse than death, it is 
dying the civil or social death. The Australian High Court has then decided that 
convicted non-citizen Australian indigenous could not be deported, with supra-
national references created outside the citizenship paradigm, the indigenous link to 
‘country’ as something more or different to civic ties to the polity, see an analysis on 
the 2020 Love case.    
Civil death may be inflicted on persons convicted of crimes against the state or even, 
at certain times and places, become determined by a court where adults are viewed as 
legally incompetent because of mental disability. In medieval Europe, felons lost all 
civil rights upon their conviction. This civil death often led to actual death, since 
anyone could kill and injure a felon with impunity. Under the Holy Roman Empire, a 
person declared civilly dead was referred to as ‘vogelfrei’ (German, for ‘free as a bird’, 
which is a counter-intuitive phrase used for being anything but free, but instead, 
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commodified, objectified, and such person could even become hunted and killed 
without consequence since they were completely outside the law. In terms of Giorgio 
Agamben’s biopolitics in his works of Homo Sacer or State of Exception, this is to 
create a lawless individual state, homo sacer, being someone protected no longer at 
law, politics, or perhaps even morals, but with their bodies exposed to the power and 
force of others. Historically, the declaring of a person as an outlaw, was a common 
form of civil death. 
Ends may or may not, ultimately, justify means. This depends on the circumstances, 
but it is a philosophy that can cause irrevocable individual suffering. For example, in 
the wake of global disaster such as climate change or emergency, and with health 
passports emerging (see here and here), indeterminacy now appears at rule, with new 
groups of social outcasts, marginalized or stigmatized and exiled potentially emerging.  
II. Australians in India - Marooned or banished? 
The Bubonic Plague (or ‘Black Death’) killed 20 million in 14th century Europe, with 
Venice imposing on all incoming ships and persons a 40 days (the ‘quarantinario’ 
period) of waiting time in hospital quarantine on an offshore island.  
At any rate, measures were taken locally, but complete border closures were not 
implemented. Throughout history, those that were sick have been exiled within a 
country (such as the US. Typhoid quarantine camps of 1892), but the sick were not 
banished from their country. Likewise, the cost and consequences of quarantining 
one’s citizens are not usually imposed on third states. The idea of putting the possibly 
sick in quarantine goes back to the ancient texts. The book of Leviticus refers to the 
quarantine of lepers.  
Today, there are currently at least 36000 Australian citizens stranded globally, the 
number including only those registered for government help to fly home. Prior to the 
pandemic, there were an estimated one million Australians living overseas. Australia 
was one of the first nations to close its borders in March 2020, barring arrivals except 
returning nationals, residents, and people granted exemptions (including celebrities 
or sport stars). Since October 2020, it has also allowed travellers from New Zealand. 
All arrivals are forced to undertake and to personally fund a two-week hotel 
quarantine. Also, citizens wishing to leave Australia need to be granted permission to 
do so, ie. the right to leave is now subject to, for example, showing that one leaves for 
at least more than 3 months. There are temporary travel caps, with about 7000 people 
allowed back into Australia per week. This number can be changed at any time, in 
January, it was halved due to the global virus mutations as well as local community 
outbreaks. 
Some 9000 Australians are currently stranded in India. India is the world's second 
most populous nation, and it contends with a surge in COVID-19 cases and deaths. In 
a controversial and problematic move, let alone from a point of citizenship theory, 
there is now emerging the de-facto exiling of citizens not allowed home. Australian 
residents and citizens who have been in India within 14 days of the date they plan to 
return home will be banned from entering Australia as of Monday May 3rd 2021. The 
temporary emergency determination, issued late on Friday, is the first time Australia 
has made it a criminal offence for its citizens to return home. Those who disobey may 
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face fines and jail - punishable by five years jail or an A$66,000 (US$51,000) fine. It 
remains to be seen if this logic become extended to other places and groups.  
‘The government does not make these decisions lightly’, Australian Minister for Health 
Gregory Hunt said. However, he emphasized that integrity of the Australian public 
health and quarantine systems are to be protected and the number of COVID-19 cases 
in quarantine facilities is reduced to a manageable level. Further, the government will 
reconsider the restrictions on May 15th 2021. Human Rights Watch's Australia 
director, Elaine Pearson stated that ‘[t]his is an outrageous response. Australians have 
a right of return to their own country.’  
This example may show that citizenship is not an absolute individual right, but, if 
anything, subject to the collective social contract. Based on the notion of service to the 
collective general good, inroads into the individual rights approach of citizenship 
(including the purchase of citizenship in CBI mechanisms) may be justified. In a risk 
of harm assessment individual cases are weighed against the collective polity / all other 
citizens. The ban on citizens returning from India may be somewhat justifiable under 
the current spirit of emergency of the pandemic.  
Measures such as this are in need of a clear sunset clause, which has arguably been 
provided to being subject to reconsideration from May 15th. These measures are 
limitations to rights subject to exceptions. It appears that the above measures are to 
protect the health system from overload and to protect the existing population. Polls 
show that Australians at home support to keeping the borders shut.  
Generally, in the pandemic still posing as a state of emergency, Australia appears to 
here evoke the floodgate argument and utilitarian weighing of internal safety vs. its 
obligations to those citizens currently outside the polity. It is not clear but possible that 
the government could have instead extended the quarantine system by adding further 
facilities instead of reducing the number of plane arrivals allowed to come in each week 
or to impose blanket bans. Imposed exile, even made temporary, may have 
repercussions for the individual or the exiled group and their perception of the social 
contract. Citizenship is not only a legal status that can be switched on- and off subject 
to the bordered paradigm. Even this being the case at law being doubtful, to many, 
citizenship is not merely a legal or a commercial link, but they associate with it the 
social contract, an obligation to solidarity and burden-sharing, as well as an identity 
coming with a moral code. 
It is not clear whether Australia could make and successfully rely on the (at any rate 
very likely flawed) argument that its citizens currently in India may be dual- or 
multiple citizens, so that their other home country, India, should look after them and 
shoulder the cost to do so. Such line of argument may diminish the status of citizenship 
itself, leading to fragmentation of citizenship into class citizenship with dual citizens 
in effect holding a lesser version of the same citizenship.  
At the same time, for example, forms of bars on plural (dual- and multiple) may 
generally be perfectly legitimate means of government action. Art.44 of Australia’s 
Constitution assumes plural citizens to holding foreign allegiance, effectively barring 
these types of Australians to stand for parliament. 
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Yet again, where there would be dual citizens, responsibility by proximity may indeed 
require India to attend to its own citizens currently in India.  
This again, and at any rate, may not take away anything of a country’s responsibility 
to allow its citizens to return.   
While Australia permits ‘citizenship of two or more countries’, providing this is legal 
according to all the relevant parties, India, however, does not in principle recognise 
plural (dual- or multiple) citizenship. By asserting Australian or other citizenship, 
India would expect renunciation of Indian citizenship. However, a certain type of ‘dual 
citizenship’ does exist: Based on the recommendations of the High-Level committee 
on Indian diaspora, the Government of India decided to create and grant Overseas 
Citizenship of India (OCI): Initially, OCI is a form of residency and is not to be 
misconstrued to function as immediate dual citizenship. A person registered as OCI is 
eligible to apply for grant of Indian citizenship under section 5(1) (g) of the Citizenship 
Act 1955 if they are registered as OCI for five years and have been residing in India for 
one year out of five years before making the application. 
At any rate, while on OCI status, card holders retain only some of the rights of Indian 
citizens, including the right to live and work in India permanently. Persons of Indian 
Origin (PIOs) who migrated from India and acquired citizenship of a foreign country 
other than Pakistan and Bangladesh, are eligible for grant of OCI as long as their home 
countries allow dual citizenship in some form or the other under their local laws. 
Persons registered as OCI have not been given any voting rights, election to Lok 
Sabha/Rajya Sabha/Legislative Assembly/Council, holding Constitutional posts such 
as President, Vice President, and Judge of Supreme Court/High Court etc. Registered 
OCIs shall be entitled to following benefits: 
(i) Multiple entry, multi-purpose life-long visa to visit India; 
(ii) Exemption from reporting to Police authorities for any length of stay in India; and 
(iii) Parity with NRIs in financial, economic and educational fields except in the 
acquisition of agricultural or plantation properties. Further benefits to OCIs, if any, 
will be notified by the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) under section 7B (1) 
of the Citizenship Act, 1955.  
Again, OCI status alone is no Indian citizenship, with civic responsibilities missing, 
such as the right to vote.  
It is not clear as to whether the stranded are in fact OCI card holders. More information 
would be needed here. However, this question may not make much difference: Neither 
OCI nor in fact dual citizenship may likely affect Australia’s responsibilities toward its 
citizens.   
The take-away from this situation may be in case that CBI systems of passport plurality 
pose at least one resolution and alternative to this current situation: By holding 
another option beyond the Australian passport, Australians in India could make use 
of CBI strategic diversification, can in other words allow the escape from both risk to 
health in India as well as from politically imposed restrictions in Australia.  
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III. Limitations to Limitations: Constitutions and Human 
Rights 
Under current pandemic lockdown conditions and curtailed global mobility, any plural 
passport holders, including many CBI holders, could be viewed as being de-facto 
exiled, prevented at any rate from leaving or entering at least one of the countries of 
which they hold passports. As I have discussed elsewhere in this forum, there is a 
universal right to leave and to return to one’s country. However, this right, as well as 
other fundamental rights and freedoms in Constitutions and Human Rights law, is 
subject to a legal weighing process which may ultimately be difficult to be 
distinguishable from real life- or political-moral matters, showcasing the limitations 
of law vis-à-vis political power especially where individual and collective rights are to 
be weighed against one another. At the same time, any of the limitations must 
themselves limited in principle, a concept that is known in the German Constitutional 
system as Schranken-Schranken (limitations to limitations), leaving a meaningful 
substance of rights based on the concept of human dignity. Human rights are norms 
arising from the state acting as custodians and fiduciaries toward citizens and even 
toward non-citizens. With sovereign power comes responsibility and duty of the 
sovereign toward the people: States are to guarantee security and equal enjoyment of 
rights and freedoms. This duty does not vanish in times of crisis, it is, if anything, a 
heightened one.  
As seen above, exile cannot be arbitrary and there is a right to return to one’s country, 
being the more specific right in the circumstances. The right to return may yet face 
some inroads and limitations imposed by municipal law. This is the case in the 
pandemic, with Australia’s Biosecurity Act (2015) or Germany’s 
Infektionsschutzgesetz (2000).  
The latter Act entitles the German government to drastic limitations over civic-rights 
as blanket measure: The Act does not distinguish between no matter a person’s status 
as vaccinated or not (its § 28c announces that status will be fleshed out in an upcoming 
Regulation, but this is not yet the case).  
Under the Australian Act, the human biosecurity emergency period pertaining to 
COVID19 gets extended periodically. The emergency has been in place since 17 March 
2020, and has again, in its latest inception, been extended by an additional three 
months until 17 June 2021, as declared by the Governor General.  
The effects of these municipal laws on individual Constitutional rights as well as 
universal Human Rights (of which states themselves are the main guarantors and 
enforcers) are problematic and subject to debate. Absent any permanent state of 
exception and crisis, there may well be general consensus that individual rights cannot 
be abrogated for indefinite periods of time. This is because all emergency powers must 
ultimately reconcile with the Rule of Law and judicial scrutiny rather than governed 
by the rule of executive power, or face the separation of powers, judicial integrity and 
the Constitution to become redundant. The abrogation of rights and rephrasing of 
rights as privileges is problematic, but would arguably fall under actual or potential 
crisis justifications still covered by the Rule of Law in an attempt of systemic self-
preservation. This, again, presupposes that the state of exception will not be a 
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permanent one, as this would otherwise entail the potential abrogation of an existing 
constitutional system and replacement with a new one, a phased system reset over 
time. 
It is problematic that the narrative of pandemic crisis at law can be a circular and 
arbitrary one. This is because the question of safety itself depends on the 
circumstances of real-life matters such as pandemic science. If that were otherwise, 
and law would alone decide over the matter of crisis, with the letter of the law creating 
demarcations of pandemic response, absurd results may follow: Functioning in the 
context of placing an anticipated end to crisis, law may in effect make a circular case, 
with the end to crisis depending on crisis’ definition at law.   
Without limitations, the abovementioned municipal laws may see crisis time extended 
ad infinitum, subject to scientific resolve of the crisis in real life. Were the thresholds 
for crisis chosen too low at law, and with crisis containing elements of real-life, crisis 
at law may never ‘end’ as such, as crisis will likely never end in life but permanently 
exist. The state of exception and rights limitations would effectively be here to stay. 
As stated in the introduction, there is a rule against arbitrary exile. However, even 
where such arbitrariness is missing in government decision making, crisis may itself 
be viewed as inherently arbitrary and indeterminate. This in turn, being at the heart 
of the issue, may consequently impact crisis response at law, rendering law itself 
indeterminate and subject to crisis. Emergency response at law may then as such be 
viewed as arbitrary, at least, with hindsight and from the perspective of longer periods 
of time, a luxury that arguably, does not exist whilst crisis endures.  
IV. The harm principle 
In classic Liberalism, the harm principle holds that the actions of individuals should 
only be limited to prevent harm to other individuals. John Stuart Mill articulated this 
principle in his work ‘On Liberty’ (1859), where he argued that ‘[t]he only purpose for 
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.’ This is based on the earlier equivalent as 
stated in France's Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789.  
The harm principle may be used by utilitarianists and libertarians alike, potentially 
justifying both pandemic restrictions, including exile, as well as providing for the 
necessary justification of avoiding the very same restrictions through multiple 
passports, enhanced visa free travel and strategic relocations. By the same token that 
individuals utilize CBI legal mechanisms to places of higher risk toward those of 
relative safety (rather than maintain solidarity through personal sacrifice), polities and 
governments seem to hold an almost absolute right to weigh risks against the collective 
in reference to the banishment of groups and individuals between the members of its 
own population. It is safe to say that plural nationality today, as a core fundamental of 
CBI systems, likely provides the basis for strategic relocation and exit from protracted 
crisis. CBI systems here pose as a perfectly legal way to avoid the difficult question of 




V. Self-exile & CBI as legitimate means to escape 
banishment 
 Voluntary (self-) exile then is one specific expression of exile here that may show 
overlap to CBI. Self-exile may utilize CBI mechanisms, but it does not have to, and one 
may exile into non-CBI jurisdictions. Self-exile may be depicted by the person who 
claims it to being some form of protest or avoidance of persecution the person who 
claims it. Others may see this as means to an end, to avoid taxation or even prosecution 
(such as for tax-evasion or criminal allegations). This depends on the particular 
circumstances on a case-by-case basis: High net worth individual citizens of a 
jurisdiction moving to a jurisdiction with lower taxes are termed ‘tax-exiles’. The 
English rock band the Rolling Stones who, in the spring of 1971, owed more in taxes 
than they could pay. They left Britain for France before the government could seize 
their assets. In 2012, Eduardo Saverin, one of the founders of Facebook, made 
headlines by renouncing his U.S. citizenship before his company's Initial public 
offering (IPO), the going public of a private company by sale of its stocks to general 
public. The dual Brazilian/U.S. citizen's decision to move to Singapore and renounce 
his citizenship resulted in a bill in the U.S. Senate, the Ex-PATRIOT Act (2012) which, 
if it had passed, would have forced such wealthy tax exiles to pay a special tax in order 
to re-enter the United States. Asil Nadir fled to the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus for 17 years rather than face prosecution in connection with the failed £1.7 bn 
company Polly Peck in the United Kingdom.  
One may ask: Are high-net worth individuals in fact choosing to self-exile? With some 
individuals holding more assets than states, the question becomes: Who is banning 
whom? 
In any case, for those exiled, while the state may still allow for citizenship status, the 
rights under this status are severely or completely curtailed. This is because some of 
the civic rights of citizenship as the right to have rights may only become fully 
expressed and expressible when one is within one’s polity of citizenship and amongst 
others, and not in isolation.   
CBI may function as a way out of government-imposed creation of an individual fate 
of exile and that may otherwise appear as irreversible, justified and echoed throughout 
a polity and a moral political as well as normative consensus that can have the 
collective sacrifice some of its own members, if only to reinforce collective narratives 
of nationhood and belonging against those who do not, cannot, belong, for whatever 
internalized narrative and justification, if any. 
The classic CBI case of the minority group of Bidoon in the middle East comes to mind, 
where any intention to actually relocate these stateless to the West-African Comoros 
was never an option. The assigning of nationality was to outcast and to deport the now 
foreigners to third countries instead. The passport bulk-purchase was a mere tool to 
initiate deportation of those who had now the citizenship status of another countries, 
were no longer stateless but foreigners about to become legally deported.  
Likewise, there was a case where Tonga had assigned uninhabitable places for its 
passport purchasers while never having sufficient space in the first place.   
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VI. Conclusion  
The relevance to be personally mobile and to leave behind disaster or dystopia in any 
given polity cannot be overstated. This is not at all to abandon one’s polity. At any rate, 
as this article has shown, those in exile can often serve their former homes, be that 
exiled writers or even entire governments. The lesson from the German Brothers 
Grimm’s most astounding fairy-tale about exile as liberation, the Bremer 
Stadtmusikanten, (the town musicians of Bremen) a fable about animals that were 
destined to becoming slaughtered by their masters the next morning. They banded 
together that night and left their farms and their pre-determined fate, creating for 
themselves new, joyful life somewhere else. Their motto was that ‘we will always find 
something better than death.’ The notion of alternative citizenship and global mobility 
is not about abandoning one’s responsibility to one’s polity. It is precisely an option 
against rogue states, arbitrariness and persecution. Choosing to leave one’s country is 
a universal Human Right is ultimately grounded by the meta-right of Human Dignity 
as the catch concept.  
Admittedly, there are also those who aim to escape their rightful punishment when 
trying to disassociate with their polity. However, black sheep in CBI do not mean that 
all the legitimate cases should become deprived from utilizing CBI global markets for 
membership entitlements and mobility systems. It is inherent in the human spirit to 
leave, to start over again, the notion of this venue alone grants hope, drives innovation 
and allows for the creation of new life beyond artificial borders or collectives imposing 
exile over individuals in an unjustified or unacceptable manner.  
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